INTRODUCTION
Jurisdiction over a parent corporation based on the ownership of a subsidiary 1 has long been an unsettled issue. Plaintiffs frequently sue the parent corporation as well as the subsidiary for claims arising out of the actions of the subsidiary. Bringing suit against the parent can be especially important when the assets of the subsidiary are insufficient for complete recovery. Many times, such suits are brought in the forum in which the actions arose or where the subsidiary has its principal place of business. However, because corporations are always subject tojurisdiction in their states of incorporation, 2 the claims against the parent and subsidiary will sometimes be brought in the subsidiary's state of incorporation.
Subsidiaries are often created for the purpose of limiting the liability of the parent corporation. The principle of limited corporate liability is deeply rooted in corporate law and is justified in terms of economic efficiency. I would like to extend special thanks to Professor A. Leo Levin for his many helpful insights and suggestions. This Comment is dedicated to my family and to my fiance, Elizabeth Geib, for their moral support throughout the year. 1 For the purposes of this Comment, a subsidiary is defined as a corporation that is at least 50% owned by another corporation (the parent).
2 See 9 WILLIAM M. FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 4309 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1985) [hereinafter FLETCHER] . In federal diversity actions, corporations are deemed to be citizens of both their states of incorporation and their places of principal business for purposes ofjurisdiction. See 1 JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 0.771] (2d ed. 1992) (pointing out that corporations have dual citizenship under the 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1958) amendment).
3 See infra notes 85-92 and accompanying text. 4 For the purposes of this Comment, a nonresident corporation is simply a corporation which is not incorporated in the state in question. The term "nonresident corporation" includes both domestic corporations (which are incorporated in another state) and foreign corporations (which are incorporated under the laws of another country). This distinction will typically be of little legal significance. In some cases, however, obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign corporation may be more difficult. See infra notes 45, 51-54 and accompanying text.
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UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 141:327 of their subsidiaries. 5 Yet a nonresident parent corporation that is forced to litigate claims against it or its subsidiary in its subsidiary's state of incorporation faces the additional costs and burdens associated with having to litigate in a forum with which the parent may have virtually no contacts. 6 The imposition of such burdens on the nonresident parent corporation undermines the very purpose of creating the subsidiary-namely, limiting the parent's liability. Delaware, for legal and financial reasons, is the state of incorporation of many American corporations.
7 As a result of Delaware's attractiveness as a corporate domicile, nonresident parent corporations that choose to create subsidiaries often do so in Delaware. Clearly, whether these nonresident parent corporations will be subject to Delaware's jurisdictional reach and forced to incur the costs of litigating there is an issue of major consequence to them. Because so many Delaware corporations are subsidiaries of nonresident parent corporations, Delaware courts have had ample opportunity to address the specific issue of whether it is constitutional to assert jurisdiction over a nonresident parent in the subsidiary's state of incorporation.
This Comment examines the constitutiopal validity of subjecting a nonresident parent corporation to jurisdiction in its subsidiary's state of incorporation. Part I sets forth the United States Supreme Court's guidelines for exercising jurisdiction over nonresident parties. This discussion includes an analysis of how lower courts have applied those guidelines when parent and subsidiary corporations are involved. Part If begins by summarizing the principles applicable to determining whether the exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident parent corporation in its subsidiary's state of incorporation is constitutional. The analysis then turns to some recent Delaware decisions which, in upholding the assertion of jurisdiction over nonresident parent corporations, interpret the 5 It is often the case that the subsidiary will have no business connection to its state of incorporation and the parent corporation will have no connection to that state whatsoever, other than having purchased or incorporated the subsidiary at some point in time.
6 See infra note 92 and accompanying text. of corporations that reincorporate choose to do so in Delaware). Delaware's appeal as a state of incorporation stems from its "attractive mix of existing corporate law rules" and its "believable assurances that it will continue to supply such a desirable mix of rules in the future." Id.
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The Court rejected Cannon's argument and ruled that corporate separation was not to be ignored in the jurisdictional context. Relying on federal common law precedents, the Court noted that the use of a subsidiary to conduct business in the forum state was not sufficient to subject the parent corporation to that state's jurisdiction. 4 According to the Court, the corporate separation between Cudahy and Cudahy Alabama was "in all respects observed," in that all transactions between the two corporations were recorded as if they were "wholly independent corporations." 5 Thus, Justice Brandeis wrote, " [t] he corporate separation, though perhaps merely formal, was real. It was not pure fiction." 16 In this context, the Court held that Cudahy was not subject to jurisdiction in North Carolina.
was presented in Cannon, 1 8 the doctrine that emerged from the Court's decision (the "Cannon doctrine") has, in the eyes of some lower courts, assumed constitutional dimensions. The doctrine is simple: a parent that retains "formal" and "real" separation from its subsidiary will not be subject to jurisdiction in a forum just because the subsidiary is subject to jurisdiction in that forum.
19
Although many courts continue to adhere to the Cannon doctrine, other courts and commentators argue that it is no longer valid, partly because it is an example of federal common law which, in light of more recent Supreme Court decisions, must be subordinated to state common law.
B. The Minimum Contacts Test of International Shoe and its Progeny
Many commentators also argue that Cannon has been superseded by the Supreme Court's so-called "minimum contacts" analysis first set forth in International Shoe Co. v In a subsequent decision, Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 40 the Court discussed constitutional jurisdictional requirements in terms of specific and general jurisdiction. "Specific" jurisdiction is present when "a controversy is related to or 'arises out of' a defendant's contacts with the forum." 41 In order for a court's exercise of specific jurisdiction to comport with due process, a "relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation" is essential.
2
Even when specific jurisdiction is absent, a state may sometimes exercise "general" jurisdiction over a party. A party may be subject to the general jurisdiction of a forum state even when the litigation is completely unrelated to any activities that took place there.
43
General jurisdiction is present only when a certain level of "continuous and systematic" contact exists between the nonresident and the While the Court was unanimous in holding that jurisdiction over Asahi was unconstitutional, the Court was divided on the question of whether Asahi had, in fact, established minimum contacts with California. Justice O'Connor was joined by three Justices in concluding that minimum contacts had not been established. 54 Four Justices maintained that Asahi had established minimum contacts by placing allegedly defective tire valves into the stream of commerce with the expectation and/or knowledge that some of the valves would end up in California. 55 These Justices concluded that California's exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable and unfair (and therefore unconstitutional) despite the existence of minimum contacts between Asahi and California. 56 Justice Stevens found it unnecessary to determine whether minimum contacts were present, arguing that this was an instance in which jurisdiction over Asahi would be unconstitutional regardless of whether such contacts existed.
5 7 Thus, five Justices agreed that in cases such as this one, a forum's exercise ofjurisdiction over a litigant might not comport with due process despite the existence of minimum contacts between that litigant and the forum.
C. The Continuing Validity of the Cannon Doctrine in Light of Erie and the International Shoe Minimum Contacts Test
As mentioned previously, many commentators have argued that the Cannon doctrine is no longer valid both because it must now be subordinated to state common law in light of Erie, and because it has been superseded by the International Shoe minimum contacts test. 58 
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Despite its many criticisms and apparent disavowals, a strong argument can be made that the Cannon doctrine still does and should constitute good law. One commentator has suggested that the Court in Cannon may have been asserting a sort of "natural law" of corporations under which formally separate corporations should be treated as separate for jurisdictional purposes. 6° One sign that the Cannon doctrine is still valid is that the Supreme Court has never repudiated it despite having had occasion to do so. 6 1 In Wis. 1983), the court ruled that Cannon was no longer relevant to the constitutional inquiry into whether jurisdiction comported with due process. See id. at 1419. In Brunswick, plaintiff Brunswick Corporation brought a patent infringement suit in Wisconsin against, among others, Hitachi Ltd. ("Hitachi"), ajapanese corporation, and Mitsubishi Electric Corporation ("MELCO"), also ajapanese corporation. See id. at 1415. Neither Hitachi nor MELCO had ever directly conducted business in Wisconsin, although both corporations sold products in Wisconsin through wholly owned subsidiaries. See id. at 1415-16. In rejecting the continuing validity of Cannon, the court stated that "the constitutional analysis under International Shoe permits consideration of a non-resident's contacts with the forum state through its wholly owned subsidiaries without regard to whether the affiliated corporations have maintained a formal separation of corporate identities." Id. at 1419. Under this standard, the court ruled that it could constitutionally exercise jurisdiction over MELCO and Hitachi because the Japanese corporations had "avail [ed] (1948) . Scophony involved a special venue statute under the Clayton Act through which service of process was effected by serving the American subsidiary of a British parent corporation. See id. at 796 & n.1. The Court ruled that the service was valid under § 12 of the Clayton Act and distinguished the case from Cannon in that this case was not a "manufacturing or selling" case. Id. at 816. Although the court did appear to retreat from Cannon, it did so only in the context of antitrust actions stating that it was "unwilling to construe § 12 in a manner to bring back the evils it abolished." Id. at 817. The clear implication of Rehnquist's assertion is that the nature of the parentsubsidiary relationship may well be a factor in determining whether jurisdiction comports with due process, but the existence of the relationship will not, in and of itself, be dispositive of the issue.
The strongest indication that Cannon retains vitality is that it is cited as both valid and current legal doctrine in a significant number of both state and federal court opinions. In Esude Cruz v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 6 4 for example, the plaintiff alleged that
Ortho Pharmaceutical Corporation ("OPC"), a NewJersey corporation, and its wholly owned subsidiary, Ortho Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
("OPI"), a Puerto Rican corporation, were responsible for workrelated injuries the plaintiff suffered while working at OPI in Puerto
Rico. 65 The Puerto Rican Workmen's Compensation Act immunizes employers against claims arising from work-related injuries, however, so the plaintiff's only hope of obtaining recovery was to file suit against OPC. 66 In affirming the lower court's dismissal of the suit against OPC for lack of jurisdiction, the court adhered to the Cannon doctrine, pointing out that " [t] he mere fact that a subsidiary company does business within a state does not confer jurisdiction over its nonresident parent, even if the parent is sole owner of the subsidiary."
67
The court further noted that the presumption of corporate separateness must be overcome by evidence that the parent in fact controls the activities of the subsidiary, and no such evidence had been presented. 68 only to § 12 of the Clayton Act Most courts that still adhere to the Cannon doctrine do not employ a purely "formalistic" approach in determining whether corporate separation between the parent and subsidiary exists. Instead, courts tend to scrutinize the nature of the parent-subsidiary relationship to determine whether the parent and subsidiary should, in fact, be treated as separate entities.
69
In addition to the lower court decisions which still explicitly recognize Cannon, there are some decisions which appear to reject the Cannon doctrine but are actually consistent with it. In Coca-Cola Co. v. Procter & Gamble Co., for example, Coca-Cola sued Procter & Gamble in Georgia for tortious interference with a contract.
70
Although Procter & Gamble did not conduct business in Georgia, many of its subsidiaries did. The court held that Georgia could exercise personal jurisdiction over Procter & Gamble based on its "pervasive and tight control" over subsidiaries that conducted business in Georgia. 7 1 In so holding, the court seemed to reject the Cannon doctrine when it ruled that the "harsh strictures" of the Cannon doctrine were no longer applicable because the holding of Cannon had been "substantially refined" by International Shoe and its progeny. 72 Despite this apparent disavowal of Cannon, the court's decision in Coca-Cola is not inconsistent with the Cannon doctrine. The Cannon doctrine simply states thatjurisdiction over a subsidiary
The court began its analysis by adopting the Cannon doctrine, stating that " [a] corporation is not doing business in a state merely by the presence of its wholly owned subsidiary." Id. at 761. In this case, however, the court held that the exercise of jurisdiction over Empire Canada would comport with due process because plaintiffs had set forth sufficient evidence that Empire Canada exercised enough control over Empire Duluth for the court to "disregard the corporate identity of Empire Duluth." Id. at 762. In other words, the corporate separation between Empire Canada and Empire Duluth was analogous to the "pure fiction" Justice Brandeis alluded to in Cannon. Cannon, 267 U.S. at 337. The court ultimately held that the exercise ofjurisdiction was invalid, however, because the Minnesota long-arm statute authorized specificjurisdiction but not generaljurisdiction, and plaintiffs had not shown any specific connection between the acts complained of and Empire Canada's business activities in Minnesota. See Bielicki, 741 F. Supp. at 764; see also Graco, Inc. v. Kremlin, Inc., 558 F. Supp. 188, 190 will not automatically establish jurisdiction over the parent corporation when "formal" and "real" separation between the parent and subsidiary is maintained. In Coca Cola, the court's decision that jurisdiction over Procter & Gamble comported with due process was reached only after a lengthy analysis of the relationship between Procter & Gamble and its subsidiaries. This analysis revealed that the subsidiaries were "equivalent to departments or divisions of [Procter & Gamble] .
" 73 The ruling that jurisdiction was proper was therefore consistent with the Cannon doctrine since the court found that formal separation between the parent and subsidiaries had not been maintained. 74 Thus, many state and federal courts adhere (either explicitly or implicitly) to the principles first embodied in Cannon when making jurisdictional determinations in cases involving parent and subsidiary corporations. 75 The tests which these courts use to evaluate parent-subsidiary relationships forjurisdictional purposes often vary in their terminology, but the tests are actually very similar. In New York, for example, courts exercise jurisdiction over foreign parent corporations if their subsidiaries are the "agents" or "mere departments" of their corporate parents (assuming the subsidiaries are subject to jurisdiction in New York). 76 Courts in other states exercise jurisdiction over nonresident parent corporations by virtue of the actions of their subsidiaries when the subsidiaries are the "alter-egos" or "instrumentalities" of the parent corporations.
77
The Delaware District Court's decision in Akzona Inc. v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. 78 evidences the similarity between agents, instrumentalities and alter-egos. In defining these terms, the Akzona 73 Id. at 308. 74 Cannon's standard for determining whether corporate separation between a parent and subsidiary exists may have been too formalistic for the court in Coca-Cola (although an actual standard for making such a determination was not really established in Cannon). Still, as mentioned at infra notes 75-84 and accompanying text, courts may scrutinize the existence of corporate separation between a parent and subsidiary more closely than Brandeis did in Cannon without being inconsistent with the Cannon doctrine. A court's decision will be consistent with the Cannon doctrine so long as the ultimate jurisdictional determination hinges on the existence (or lack) of corporate separation between the parent and subsidiary, regardless of whether a formalistic standard is used in making that determination. court stated that "[i]n order to find that a subsidiary is the alter ego or instrumentality of the parent, the plaintiff must prove: 'control by the parent to such a degree that the subsidiary has become its mere instrumentality.'" 79 Similarly, a finding that a subsidiary is a parent's agent involves "a determination that the separate corporate identities of the subsidiary and parent are a fiction and that the subsidiary is, in fact, being operated as a department of the parent. The parent must have actual, participatory and total control of the subsidiary."
80
As Akzona makes clear, the main factor in deciding whether a subsidiary is a parent's agent, instrumentality, or alter-ego is the extent to which the parent exercises control over the subsidiary. In this sense, the jurisdictional analysis of a parent-subsidiary relationship parallels the corporate-veil-piercing analysis used to determine a parent's substantive liability for the actions of its subsidiary.
81
Other factors relevant to the determination of whether to pierce the corporate veil for both jurisdictional and substantive liability purposes include the extent to which the parent finances the subsidiary, whether the parent owns all of the subsidiary's stock, whether the parent caused the incorporation of the subsidiary, whether the parent and subsidiary have common officers and directors, and whether the subsidiary is undercapitalized. 2 If, after going through this analysis, a court determines that a parent and subsidiary are legitimately separate corporate entities, contacts with the forum aside from the ownership of a subsidiary 81 See 1 FLETCHER, supra note 2, § 43.70 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1990) (discussing instances in which courts will ignore the separation between the parent and subsidiary forjurisdictional purposes); Knudsen, supra note 20, at 919. Although courts employ similar analyses in the context ofjurisdiction as they do in the context of substantive liability, the standards for acquiringjurisdiction are not as strict as the applicable tests in liability cases in that fraud or wrongdoing are not required elements for a finding ofjurisdiction over the absent corporation. 
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will generally be necessary in order to subject the parent to the forum's jurisdiction. s3 In this sense, the law appears to integrate aspects of the Cannon doctrine into the minimum contacts analysis: although a parent's ownership of a subsidiary incorporated or conducting business in the forum state constitutes a contact with the forum state, a more lengthy veil-piercing analysis is necessary before it can be determined whether this contact alone suffices under the International Shoe minimum contacts test.
84
D. The Justification for Continued Adherence to Cannon
The continued adherence to Cannon is fully justifiable because the Cannon doctrine is based on sound legal and economic principles. One of the deeply rooted principles of the law of corporations is that stockholders of a corporation are not to be held personally responsible for the liabilities of a corporation. The most notable exception to the general rule of non-liability of a parent corporation is the situation in which the corporate separation between the parent and subsidiary is not legitimately maintained, or is, as Justice Brandeis wrote in Cannon, "pure fiction." 89 When corporate separation is not legitimately maintained, the "corporate veil" will be pierced and the parent corporation will be held substantively liable for the debts or acts of its subsidiaries. 9° The piercing of the corporate veil protects credicorporations in which they own shares). Cannon simply applies this principle of limited liability to cases in which the issue is whether jurisdiction should be exercised over the parent corporation based on the actions of its subsidiary. If a parent and subsidiary are legitimately separate corporate entities, then the parent will not be liable for the actions of its subsidiary. If a parent must nevertheless litigate claims stemming from the actions of its subsidiary in a forum where it would not otherwise be subject to jurisdiction, the parent corporation will be exposed to the burdens associated with having to litigate in a forum with which it has negligible contacts, even if the final outcome is the exoneration of the parent corporation.
These burdens include increased litigation costs 92 and the possibility that the forum's laws may be unfavorable to the corporation. In addition, the parent corporation's officers and directors may have to divert much of their attention away from more productive matters to the litigation. The imposition of such burdens on the parent corporation runs counter to the very purpose of limiting the liability of the parent corporation in the first place and therefore arguably offends traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Thus, the integration of the Cannon doctrine (and the general principles of limited corporate liability) into the International Shoe test is both legally and economically justifiable.
II. JURISDICTION OVER A PARENT CORPORATION IN
ITS SUBSIDIARY'S STATE OF INCORPORATION
The preceding analysis provides a general framework for determining when a court can appropriately exercise jurisdiction over a parent corporation based on the actions of its subsidiary. Litigation in this context arises very often in the subsidiary's 91 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 87, at 111. 92 A corporation that is forced to litigate in a forum with which it has virtually no contacts is likely to incur litigation costs above those that would be incurred in a forum with which the corporation has many contacts. These additional costs include, but are not limited to, attorney's fees for local counsel, paying travel expenses for executives and/or witnesses and the general costs associated with becoming familiar with the laws of a particular forum. These added costs are likely to have the most significant impact on foreign corporations (especially those that are not otherwise amenable to suit in the United States) and on small to medium-sized domestic corporations.
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JURISDICTION OVER A PARENT CORPORATION 345 principal place of business or in a forum where a subsidiary does substantial business. Part II, however, will deal only with the specific issue of when a parent will be subject to jurisdiction in its subsidiary's state of incorporation. An important factor to keep in mind throughout this discussion is that corporations often have virtually no relationship with their states of incorporation (unlike with their principal states of business). Delaware, for example, is the state of incorporation of a significant number of the United States' largest corporations, but most of those corporations do very little, if any, business in Delaware, and very few of them actually have their principal places of business in Delaware. Given that a subsidiary may have virtually no relationship to its state of incorporation, a nonresident parent corporation is likely to have even less of a connection to its subsidiary's state of incorporation. Very often, the parent's only relationship to that state will be that it once filed documents necessary to incorporate its subsidiary there. This part begins by summarizing the constitutional issues specifically applicable to a determination of whether a parent can be subjected to jurisdiction in its subsidiary's state of incorporation. This summary is followed by an analysis of recent Delaware decisions in which nonresident parent corporations of Delaware subsidiaries have been subjected to the jurisdiction of the Delaware courts.
A. The Constitutional Appropriateness of Exercising Jurisdiction Over a Nonresident Parent Corporation in its Subsidiaiy's State of Incorporation
Even though the Supreme Court has never directly addressed the issue of when jurisdiction over a parent corporation in the subsidiary's state of incorporation is appropriate, the decisions in Cannon and International Shoe and its progeny lay out the basic framework necessary to make such a determination. If only the Cannon doctrine were applied, a parent corporation would not be subject to jurisdiction in the state of incorporation of its subsidiary (absent any other contacts with the state) so long as formal separation between the parent and subsidiary existed. On the other hand, if the subsidiary were the agent, alter-ego, or instrumentality of the parent, the separation would be more analogous to the "pure fiction" mentioned by Justice Brandeis in Cannon, and jurisdiction over the parent corporation would be valid under the Cannon doctrine.
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The constitutional issue is not so simple in light of International Shoe and its progeny, especially under the hypothetical assumption that International Shoe has rendered the Cannon doctrine obsolete. To the extent that Shaffer holds that ownership of property in the forum state is not itself sufficient to justify jurisdiction over a nonresident property owner, the mere ownership of the stock of a subsidiary should not subject a nonresident parent to the forum's jurisdiction.
9 3
Shaffer implies more, however: if the cause of action is related to the property, then jurisdiction may be valid. In this sense, the argument can be made that a suit alleging wrongdoing on the part of a subsidiary is related to a nonresident parent corporation's property (i.e., its ownership of the subsidiary's stock). There is reason to think that the Shaffer Court would have rejected this argument. The types of claims to which the Shaffer Court was probably referring differ from those which would most likely arise in the parent-subsidiary context. For example, the Court would likely have upheld jurisdiction if the controversy involved claims to the property itself.
9 4 Yet this type of claim would not arise in the parent-subsidiary context unless the ownership of the subsidiary's stock itself were at issue.
The Court also stated that jurisdiction might be appropriate for claims where the cause of action is related to "rights and duties" growing out of the ownership of the property such as suits for injury suffered on the land of a nonresident owner. However, in Shaffer, the Court's decision invalidating jurisdiction over the nonresident directors did not hinge on the fact that the nonresident directors only owned a small percentage of Greyhound stock. Instead, the court ruled that there was simply no relationship between the directors' duties as directors (at issue in the suit) and their ownership of some of Greyhound's stock. 
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jurisdictional determination in the parent-subsidiary context is whether ownership of a subsidiary's stock is unrelated to a cause of action stemming from the acts of the subsidiary. A strong argument can be made that because a parent and subsidiary are legally separate entities and the law of corporations limits the liability of stockholders, mere ownership of a subsidiary's stock bears no relation to causes of action arising out of the acts of a subsidiary when the corporate separation between the parent and subsidiary is legitimately maintained. 7 Thus, just as directors' duties to their corporations are unrelated to their ownership of stock, a parent's ownership of a subsidiary's stock is arguably unrelated to the actions of the subsidiary. Consequently, Shaffer ought not to allow jurisdiction over a parent based solely on its ownership of the stock of a subsidiary.
The standard enunciated in World-Wide Volkswagen also dictates against exercising jurisdiction over a parent corporation based only on its ownership of the stock of a subsidiary. After World-Wide Volkswagen, the issues central to determining a parent corporation's amenability to suit in its subsidiary's state of incorporation are:
(1) whether a parent "purposefully avails" itself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum state when it incorporates a subsidiary there, and (2) whether a parent corporation can "reasonably anticipate" being haled into court in the state of incorporation of its subsidiary.
98
The proposition that the incorporation of a subsidiary constitutes purposeful availment of the laws of the subsidiary's state of incorporation has little merit. There is little difference in principle between incorporating (or purchasing) a subsidiary in a state and purchasing or building a house there. In both cases there may be a benefit to utilizing the laws of the forum state,9 but in neither case should a party be amenable to suit in that state for causes of action unrelated to the ownership of the property. Furthermore, in most cases, a parent that maintains legitimate separation from its subsidiary will probably not "reasonably anticipate" being haled into court in the state of incorporation of its subsidiary. After all, many jurisdictions have followed the Cannon doctrine for 65 years by requiring more than a showing of ownership over a subsidiary in order for jurisdiction to be asserted over a nonresident parent. The nature of the relationship between the parent and subsidiary becomes important in the context of the Court's decision in Helicopteros. If the separation between the parent and subsidiary is fictitious, and they are, for practical purposes, the same entity, then the parent is arguably subject to general jurisdiction wherever the subsidiary is subject to general jurisdiction, including the subsidiary's state of incorporation.
1°° If corporate separation is legitimately maintained, the parent would be subject to specific jurisdiction in the subsidiary's state of incorporation only if the litigation "arises" out of the parent's actions in that state, such as incorporating, purchasing, or even exercising control over some of the actions of the subsidiary.
10 1
Finally, Asahi points out that there may be some instances in which jurisdiction would not comport with due process even if minimum contacts between a party and the forum exist. Subjecting a parent to suit in the state of incorporation of its subsidiary solely on the basis of its having incorporated that subsidiary may well be one such instance in which jurisdiction would be unconstitutional even the if the ownership of the stock of the local subsidiary were considered a minimum contact. This inference is supported by the corporate law principle favoring limited shareholder liability, especially when shareholders do not exercise complete control over the activities of the corporations in which they own stock.
03
The above analysis reveals that there are no constitutional problems to subjecting a parent that incorporates a subsidiary as an alter-ego, agent, or instrumentality to jurisdiction in the subsidiary's state of incorporation. Such a result would be consistent with both Cannon and the International Shoe minimum contacts cases. As alluded to previously in Part I, a strong argument can be made that Cannon has been integrated into the International Shoe minimum 100 Under such circumstances, the parent corporation would be considered to have a "continuous and systematic" contact with the subsidiary's state of incorporation. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416 (1984) .
'10 See id. at 414 n.8. 
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contacts analysis, and rightly so. 10 4 If this is the case, the force of the Cannon doctrine should bear heavily on situations in which a parent establishes a subsidiary that is a legitimately separate corporate entity. In such instances, the parent's incorporation and ownership of the subsidiary's stock may be relevant factors in determining if minimum contacts with the subsidiary's state of incorporation exist, but should not be treated as contacts sufficient to satisfy the International Shoe test. Even if one were to reject the proposition that Cannon has been integrated into International Shoe, however, the International Shoe minimum contacts cases raise serious doubts as to the constitutional validity of subjecting a nonresident parent corporation to the jurisdiction of its subsidiary's state of incorporation based solely on its ownership of that subsidiary's stock.
B. Delaware's Expansive Exercise ofJurisdiction
Whether a parent corporation should be subject to the jurisdiction of its subsidiary's state of incorporation is an issue not likely to arise frequently before courts in much of the United States. In many cases, both the parent and subsidiary are incorporated in the same state, while in other cases suits are brought in the subsidiary's principal place of business, a state often different from the subsidiary's state of incorporation. Delaware, however, has a unique tendency to attract a disproportionate number of corporations to incorporate within its borders. Not surprisingly, the Delaware courts have had ample opportunity to examine this issue at length. The Delaware Supreme Court has construed the jurisdictional reach of its courts very expansively and has, in most cases, held that jurisdiction over the nonresident parent was proper. The Delaware decisions are of great significance not only because so many nonresident corporations choose to incorporate subsidiaries there, but also because many other states look to Delaware corporate law for guidance in developing their own corporate law.
The following four hypothetical situations illustrate possible justifications for subjecting a nonresident parent of a Delaware subsidiary to jurisdiction in Delaware: 1) the local subsidiary is the alter-ego, agent, or instrumentality of the parent; 2) the cause of action arises out of the very act of incorporating (or purchasing) the subsidiary; 3) the parent, by incorporating (or purchasing) the subsidiary, sets in motion a chain of events from which the cause of action arises; or 4) the parent, by opting not to reincorporate the subsidiary in another state, chooses to operate the subsidiary as a Delaware corporation, thereby availing itself of the benefits of Delaware law.
The first example merits little discussion. The corporate separation between the parent and the subsidiary is essentially fictitious when a subsidiary is a parent's alter-ego, agent, or instrumentality, and the parent and subsidiary should be treated as the same entity. Therefore, under both the Cannon doctrine and the International Shoe minimum contacts test (as well as a test integrating the two lines of cases), the parent can be regarded as having the same contacts to the subsidiary's state of incorporation as does the subsidiary. As a result, the exercise ofjurisdiction over the parent in the subsidiary's state of incorporation comports with both due process and principles of limiting corporate liability.
5
The situation is more complex, however, when corporate formalities between the parent and subsidiary are, in fact, observed and the actions of a subsidiary cannot be imputed to the parent. Assuming that such formalities are observed and the parent and subsidiary are legitimately separate entities, the latter three hypothetical situations present constitutional questions which are discussed below. The implication of this result is that the parent would be subject to jurisdiction in Delaware for causes of action completely unrelated to acts of the subsidiary. This is not unjustified, however, since the subsidiary's Delaware citizenship could be attributed to the parent by virtue of the lack of separation between the parent and subsidiary. 
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subsidiaries to use the name "Sears." Originally, PLC had incorporated "Sears, Inc." in Delaware, intending that it be a holding company of other American subsidiaries (owned directly or indirectly by PLC).
10 7
Sears, Roebuck immediately brought a claim against Sears, Inc. for alleged trade name infringement. Sears, Inc. agreed to change its name to Delaware Mercantile Holdings, Inc. ("DMH") as part of a settlement in this phase of the litigation. 1 8 Although this portion of the dispute was never fully litigated, it seems obvious that, for this claim at least, the cause of action arose from PLC's very act of incorporating Sears, Inc. DMH's former use of the name Sears, Inc., after all, stemmed from PLC's act of incorporating DMH in Delaware.1° Thus, had the court been faced with a complaint against PLC in this specific portion of the litigation, it would have been completely justified in exercising jurisdiction over PLC because "by incorporating a subsidiary in Delaware... PLC performed an act in state sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction over it for causes of action related to that act of incorporation."
110
The court's decision was not limited to a ruling on trade name infringement claims against DMH. Those claims were apparently settled out of court. 1 1 Sears, Roebuck's complaint against PLC alleged that PLC caused both its Delaware and non-Delaware subsidiaries to use the name "Sears" in violation of Sears, Roebuck's trade name. PLC's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction over these claims was granted in part and denied in part. The claims against PLC for the trade name infringements of its Delaware subsidiaries were not dismissed, 112 while the claims against PLC 109 At this juncture, it should be noted that a majority of states, including Delaware, authorize one or more persons, including corporations, to act as "incorporators" ofbusiness corporations. See IA FLETCHER, supra note 2, § 85 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1983) . The fact that a parent corporation can incorporate a subsidiary itself is important for jurisdictional purposes because if the subsidiary had been incorporated by individuals not acting as agents of Sears PLC then Sears PLC could not be said to have "incorporated" the subsidiary and therefore may not have performed the "act of incorporation" in Delaware.
110 Sears, Roebuck established that PLC sufficiently "directed and controlled" its Delaware subsidiaries' use of the trade name Sears so as to be subject to jurisdiction in Delaware. 116 Thus, it appears that jurisdiction over PLC was not, in the end, based primarily on PLC's having effected the incorporation of DMH (since whatever claims involving a Delaware subsidiary other than DMH).
11s The court ruled that the exercise of specificjurisdiction over PLC for alleged trade name infringements of PLC's non-Delaware subsidiaries "would run afoul of due process" because none of those infringements arose out of PLC's contacts with Delaware. Sears Ii, 752 F. Supp. at 1228.
114 This reliance on DMH's single jurisdictional act is somewhat curious. Assuming that DMH was a separate corporate entity from PLC (a fact that was under dispute), it could hardly be said that DMH's acts of trade name infringement, other than its own previous use of the name Sears, were related to PLC's act of incorporating DMH. The court did not explain how the alleged trade name infringement by Delaware subsidiaries other than DMH was specifically related to PLC's act of incorporating DMH. In fact, it seems likely that the alleged infringement by these subsidiaries was completely unrelated to the actual act of incorporating DMH.
"' In Sears II, the court analyzed the nature of the relationship between PLC and DMH and found that a limited agency relationship existed: PLC "'directed and controlled'" DMH in the accomplishment of infringing plaintiff's trade name. Sears II, 744 F. Supp. at 1306 (quoting Altech Indus. Inc. v. Al Tech Specialty Steel, 542 F. Supp. 53, 55 (D. Del. 1982)). In a footnote, the court noted that "specificjurisdiction over PLC may also be predicated under this limited agency theory." Id. at 1306 n.7. The Sears court relied on Altech as precedent for finding this agency relationship. In Altech, plaintiff Altech Industries alleged trade name infringement against GATX and its Delaware subsidiary Al Tech Specialty Steel ("Al Tech"). Al Tech became GATX's subsidiary not because it was incorporated by GATX, but by virtue of GATX's acquisition ofAl Tech's stock. The court noted that " [t] he mere acquisition by GATX of all of the stock of defendant Al Tech violated no right of the plaintiff; standing alone it gave rise to no cause of action. The wrong occurred when... GATX directed and controlled the defendant Al Tech in infringing plaintiff's trade name." Altech, 542 F. Supp. at 55 (emphasis added). Similarly, it would seem that PLC's incorporation of DMH, standing alone, did not give rise to the cause of action against PLC for trade name infringement allegations against its subsidiaries, other than DMH's onetime use of the name Sears, which was presumably settled out of court.
16 See Sears II1, 752 F. Supp. at 1224, 1230 n.11. It is not clear whether the Sears court's "limited agency theory" constituted a finding that PLC's Delaware subsidiaries were agents, alter-egos, or instrumentalities of PLC. Had such a finding clearly been made, PLC would have arguably been subject to general jurisdiction in Delaware since the Delaware citizenship of its subsidiaries could have been attributed to PLC. wrongs arose out of DMH's one-time use of the trade name "Sears, Inc." were apparently dealt with in an out of court settlement between DMH and Sears, Roebuck), but was based on the premise that DMH and other subsidiaries were sufficiently controlled by PLC so as to attribute their trade name infringements to PLC through a limited agency relationship.
117 Still, the court never disavowed its reliance in Sears H on PLC's act of incorporating DMH as one basis for exercising jurisdiction over PLC for claims against subsidiaries other than DMH. Thus, the Sears cases are consistent with constitutional jurisdictional standards to the extent they stand for the limited proposition that when ajurisdictional act, such as incorporating a subsidiary, in and of itself wrongfully harms a plaintiff, the parent corporation will be subject to specific jurisdiction in the subsidiary's state of incorporation.
118 This proposition is consistent with the specific jurisdiction test of Helicopteros." 9 It is conceivable that the court's holding in the Sears cases could be construed more broadly to include claims that do not arise from the specific act of incorporating a subsidiary (such as the alleged trade name infringements of subsidiaries other than DMH). Such a broad construction of Sears would raise constitutional concerns since it is difficult to conceive how the tortious acts by subsidiaries other than DMH arose from or were even remotely related to the specific act of incorporating DMH. In such case, the Supreme Court's requirement in Helicopteros that the controversy be "related to" or "arise out of" the defendant's contacts with the forum would appear not to have been met. 118 Similarly, it follows that if the purchase of a subsidiary is wrongful, the parent will be subject to claims arising therefrom in the state of incorporation of the subsidiary.
119 In addition, this result is not inconsistent with Cannon because Cannon did not involve facts where jurisdiction over the parent corporation could have been based on specific acts committed by theparent corporation in the forum. See Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U.S. 333 (1925) .
120 This requirement would clearly be met if the Sears court's primary reliance were on the limited agency theory, however, in which case the controversies would arise out of PLC's contacts with its subsidiaries since the actions of the subsidiaries could be attributed to PLC. Thus, a "'relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation'" would be properly established. Thus, the court concluded that this was a case in which the cause of action was related to Bosch's contacts with Delaware.
6
The court did not find it necessary to address the issue of whether RBNA was the alter-ego, instrumentality, or agent of Bosch when it acquired Borg-Warner's stock. Based on the facts of the case, it seems relatively obvious that such a finding could have been made and, as a result, jurisdiction over Bosch would clearly have been (1980). 134 Here, the Delaware Supreme Court appears to be referring to the test for specific jurisdiction enunciated in Helicopteros by the United States Supreme Court: "When a controversy is related to or 'arises out of' a defendant's contacts with the forum, the Court has said that a 'relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation' is the essential foundation of in personamjurisdiction." Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombiav. Hall, 466 U.S. 408,414 (1984) . 1986) , where the court held that jurisdiction over a nonresidejnt parent corporation existed where the parent had incorporated a Delaware subsidiary in order to effectuate a merger around which the lawsuit was centered.
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warranted. 13 7 The court also accorded little weight to the fact that the contract in dispute had not been entered into in Delaware and was between a resident of Maryland and a West German corporation.
3 8
In reaching its decision thatjurisdiction over Bosch was proper, the court relied primarily on the notion that Bosch, by incorporating RBNA and thereby taking advantage of the benefits of Delaware law, had set in motion a chain of events which culminated in RBNA's receipt of Borg-Warner's stock.
13 9 The court's reliance on this reasoning is justifiable to the extent that Bosch's incorporation of RBNA was a necessary cause of the transaction from which plaintiff's claim arose: had Bosch not incorporated RBNA, the stock exchange between RBNA and Borg-Warner would not have taken place. However, the same argument could be made of a parent corporation that incorporated a subsidiary three years prior to the subsidiary's involvement in an alleged tort: had the subsidiary not been incorporated, it would not have committed the tort. Yet unlike the factual scenario in Papendick, the tort that was eventually committed by the subsidiary in the latter example would not, in all likelihood, have been within the parent's contemplation when the subsidiary was incorporated three years earlier. 138 It is important to note that in cases such as this one, the action could have been brought in the forum where the contract was entered into, Maryland, or in Bosch's country of incorporation, West Germany. Thus, forums other than Delaware were, in all probability, available to plaintiff.
'3 9
See supra text accompanying note 135. 140 Absent such a requirement, there may be cases involving different facts that apply the reasoning of Papendick to exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident parent corporation even though the relationship between the jurisdictional act and the litigation is not sufficiently close to satisfy due process.
Had the court found that an agency or alter-egorelationship between Bosch and RBNA existed, there would have been no question that plaintiff's harm was related to Bosch's contacts with Delaware since RBNA's actions could be attributed to Bosch under a general jurisdiction theory.
141 Delaware's long-arm statute is based on Illinois' statute. See Sears III, 752 F.
order for jurisdiction to be present in Illinois, the jurisdictional act (which the incorporation of RBNA represented in Papendick) must be a "critical step[] in the chain of events" that culminates in the cause of action before the court. 14 2 Although, the facts in Papendick appear to support a finding of jurisdiction over Bosch under the Illinois test, the Delaware Supreme Court did not adopt this critical step requirement. Instead, the court used broad language stating that minimum contacts between Delaware and Bosch existed because Bosch, by incorporating RBNA and using it as a vehicle for the contested transaction, had "purposefully availed itself of the benefits and protections of the laws of the State of Delaware for financial gain in activities related to the cause of action."
143
Thus, Papendick could be construed to permit the exercise of jurisdiction over a parent whose act of incorporating a subsidiary was not closely related to the cause of action.
144
The "critical step" test adopted by the Illinois courts seems to increase the probability that the cause of action will be sufficiently related to or arise from the parent corporation's act of incorporating the subsidiary to satisfy the Helicopteros specific jurisdiction requirement. Nonetheless, the critical step test also has potential deficiencies. The test could conceivably encompass some instances The nonresident parent corporation's only act in Delaware was to cause the incorporation of its Delaware subsidiaries many years previously. See id. at *4. The court ruled that the claims against the parent corporation were "in no sense" related to the parent's having incorporated the subsidiaries in Delaware and that the cause of action therefore did not "arise" from any acts committed by the parent corporation in Delaware. Id. at *7. The court's decision in Red Sail was based on the absence of jurisdiction under the Delaware long-arm statute, and a constitutional analysis was therefore unnecessary. See id. at *6-*7. Still, the court's finding that defendant's claims did not "arise" from the act of incorporation would presumably have been the same under a constitutional analysis. Thus, the Delaware Chancery Court would apparently construe Papendick narrowly, thereby avoiding the potential constitutional problems that would arise if Papendick were construed broadly.
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in which the subsidiary's wrongful act really has little to do with the parent's sole jurisdictional act of incorporating the subsidiary.
145
In such instances, the parent corporation would be subject to jurisdiction for causes of action not arising from or related to the jurisdictional acts of the parent in the state-a result violative of due process under Helicopteros. Rather than tolerate the critical step test's potential constitutional deficiencies, courts should examine the facts of each case to determine whether the subsidiary was the alter-ego, instrumentality, or agent of the parent. In such cases, courts could confidently assert that the parent had sufficient control over the subsidiary's role in the cause of action to make the parent amenable to jurisdiction for claims arising out of the subsidiary's actions wherever the subsidiary could be tried for such claims. This result would be consistent with both the Cannon doctrine and the International Shoe minimum contacts test.
146
As mentioned previously, the facts in Papendich clearly indicate that the court could have found that RBNA had acted as Bosch's agent, alter-ego, or instrumentality in the purchase of BorgWarner's shares, thereby rendering Bosch subject to Delaware's jurisdiction. Therefore, the Delaware Supreme Court undoubtedly reached the correct result in exercising jurisdiction over Bosch. Notwithstanding the result, the reasoning underlying the court's opinion in Papendick may potentially conflict with Cannon and the International Shoe minimum contacts test.
Jurisdiction Over a Nonresident Parent by Virtue of its Ownership of a Delaware Subsidiary
Sternberg v. O'Nei 1 47 is the most controversial and potentially far-reaching jurisdictional decision handed down by the Delaware Supreme Court in the context of parent-subsidiary relationships. Sternberg involved a double derivative action 148 against GenCorp, 145 For example, a parent might incorporate a subsidiary, and on the next day, an employee of the subsidiary could negligently cause a fire in another state, perhaps in the subsidiary's state of principal business. The act of incorporating the subsidiary may well have been a critical step towards the occurrence of the next day's accident since the employee would not even have had ajob with the subsidiary if it had not existed. It is hard to imagine, though, how the act of incorporating the subsidiary would actually be related to the fire.
146 See supra notes 93-104 and accompanying text. 147 550 A.2d 1105 (Del. 1988) . 148 Double derivative suits enable shareholders of a parent corporation to sue on an Ohio corporation, and RKO General ("RKO"), a wholly owned Delaware subsidiary of GenCorp. The complaint alleged that officers and directors of GenCorp and RKO had breached their fiduciary duties to GenCorp shareholders by making numerous false and misleading statements to the FCC.
14 9
The Delaware Chancery Court dismissed the claims against GenCorp for lack ofjurisdiction and against RKO for failure to join an indispensable party, namely GenCorp.
5°
The court recognized that GenCorp, by registering to do business in Delaware, had appointed an agent to receive service of process in Delaware and, therefore, had arguably consented to general jurisdiction in Delaware. 151 Nevertheless, the court ruled that the United States Supreme Court's minimum contacts test must be met even in cases where jurisdiction over a party is based on statutory consent.
52
The court noted that GenCorp's only contacts with Delaware were its registration to do business in Delaware and its purchase of RKO more than 30 years previously.1 53 These acts had no connection behalf of a subsidiary even if the shareholders do not own any of the subsidiary's stock. The action is based on the fact that the parent corporation, by virtue of its ownership of the subsidiary's stock, has derivative rights to a cause of action possessed by the subsidiary. Double derivative actions can redress wrongs directly inflicted upon the parent corporation as well as those inflicted on the subsidiary. See
